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Abstract
The paper investigates the pricing of stock index options on the Deutscher Ak-
tienindex (DAX) traded on the Deutsche Terminborse (DTB) as well as the
distributions of terminal index values implied by the market prices of these
options. As one main result we nd that the martingale restriction is violated,
meaning that the index level implied by option prices is signicantly greater
than the observed index price. The pricing dierences can partly be explained
by variables like the number of options available for the estimation, their aver-
age relative moneyness and their average relative bid-ask spread. Put options
are consistently underpriced by the Black and Scholes model whereas calls are
overpriced when both the volatility and the index price are estimated from op-
tion price data. Variables like moneyness and squared moneyness can explain
part of the variation in pricing errors. Finally, implied distributions are sys-
tematically dierent from the lognormal or binomial distributions of the Black
and Scholes [2] or Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein [4] model. For puts we observe
an extra premium for Arrow-Debreu securities paying o in states with a very
low index value.
1 Introduction
The idea to infer parameters of the underlying stock price distribution from market prices
of options was rst introduced by Latane and Rendleman [8]. As an estimate for the
volatility of the stock they used the value ̂ which set the market price of the option equal
to its theoretical value given by the Black and Scholes [2] formula. Several empirical studies,
e.g. by Chiras and Manaster [3], showed that this implied volatility is not constant across
all the options for a given underlying stock. As a consequence weighting schemes were
developed to aggregate the dierent estimates into one number which then represented the
volatility estimate for the stock. For example, Chiras and Manaster [3] suggested to use as
a weight the elasticity of the option price with respect to its volatility, whereas Beckers [1]
found that the best estimate was the implied volatlity of the option which was closest at the
money. Other possibilities are to give equal weights to the individual implied volatilities
or to use as weights the partial derivatives of the option prices with respect to volatility.
1 Institut fur Entscheidungstheorie und Unternehmensforschung, University of Karlsruhe, D-76128
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A dierent approach to this weighting problem was devoloped by Whaley [16] who used a
non-linear regression to obtain a common volatility estimate for all the options on a given
underlying.
While all these methods just infer one parameter (the volatility) from the market prices
of options Manaster and Rendleman [11] used pairs of prices to estimate volatilities and
implied underlying prices simultaneously. Taking a pair of prices both of which do not
violate basic no-arbitrage conditions there is always a solution for the implied parameters
which will set the observed prices equal to the theoretical values. When there are more than
two options there will in general be no perfect t of theoretical to observed prices, so that
again a non-linear regression procedure can be used to estimate the implied underlying
value and volatility at the same time.
In a recent study Longsta [9] used this approach to obtain estimates of the implied
S&P 100 value from options traded on this index. He then compared these implied values
to the observed index value to check what he calls the martingale restriction. If all the
options were priced according to the same no-arbitrage model implied and observed index
levels would have to be equal. In the absence of arbitrage any discrepancies between the
two index prices must be due to market frictions like transaction costs or short selling
restrictions. Longsta's main result is that the implied value for the S&P 100 index is
almost always larger than the observed index price so that the martingale restriction in
its pure theoretical form is violated. By means of a regression analysis Longsta shows
that the dierences are related to frictions in the options market (like the bid-ask spread)
as well as option characteristics like moneyness (percentage dierence between underlying
price and strike price) and time to maturity. Furthermore, dierences between theoretical
and observed option prices are at least partly explained by market frictions like the bid-ask
spread.
Finally, Rubinstein [12] proposed a technique that goes one step further and avoids an
inherent weakness of Longsta's approach, since a researcher cannot be sure that the
model used by market participants for valuing options is the one that he uses to infer im-
plied parameters and to test the martingale restricition. Instead of only estimating certain
moments of the underlying distribution from market data Rubinstein infers the complete
distribution for the underlying price from the prices of traded options.2 To do so he rst
species an a priori distribution (in his case the binomial discretization of a lognormal
distribution), and then an optimization is performed to obtain an implied distribution
which is as close as possible to the lognormal in the sense of squared distances between
state probabilities. The resulting distribution is constrained to exhibit positive probabilit-
ies for all terminal states and to yield theoretical option prices which fall between the bid
and the ask quote of the options used in the estimation.3 The basic idea behind Rubin-
stein's approach is the well-known fact that in a complete and frictionless market without
arbitrage opportunities there exists a unique probability measure Q called the forward
2 Strictly speaking also Longsta [9] infers the complete distribution from market prices by choosing
a class of distributions that is completely specied by just the mean (the forward price of the implied
index level) and the standard deviation (the implied volatility). The important dierence between the two
approaches is that Rubinstein does not prespecify the type of implied distribution.
3 The resulting terminal stock price distribution can also be used as an input to compute an implied
binomial tree which could then be used to compute theoretical prices for American options. See also
Rubinstein [13] for a simplied exposition of this approach.
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risk-adjusted measure which can be used to price all assets in the economy according to
the formula Pt = dt;T Ê
Q
t [PT ]. Here Pt (PT ) denotes the price of an asset at time t (T ), dt;T
is the discount factor from t to T , and Ê
Q
t denotes expectation under Q conditional on all
available information at time t.4 Given a sucient number of option price observations the
pricing equation can be inverted to obtain an estimate of the market's assessment of state
probabilities. In subsequent papers, e.g. by Jackwerth and Rubinstein [6], this approach
was rened with respect to estimation techniques.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an empirical analysis of distributions implied by
the prices of German stock index options as well as to test the validity of the martingale
restriction for the pricing of these derivative contracts. European options on the most
important German stock index, the DAX (Deutscher Aktienindex), are actively traded
on the DTB (Deutsche Terminborse) since August 19, 1991. The DAX is an index of
thirty German blue chip stocks that is adjusted for dividends and capital changes of
the component stocks, so that an option on the DAX can be valued easily as one on
an underlying that does not pay dividends. Together with the fact that the options are
European there are basically ideal conditions to apply simple valuation models, e.g. the
Black and Scholes model or the binomial option pricing model developed by Cox, Ross,
and Rubinstein [4].
Up to this point there are only a few empirical studies on the pricing of stock index op-
tions traded on the DTB. The paper thus lls a gap in empirical capital market research in
Germany, since the DAX options traded on the DTB are one of the most liquid derivative
contracts traded in Germany. Currently the typical daily volume for DAX options is well
above 100,000 contracts, making it the most liquid contract on the DTB as a whole. The
paper further integrates the approaches by Longsta [9] and Rubinstein [12] by simultan-
eously testing the martingale restriction and calculating implied distributions based on the
same samples. The results are therefore very useful to determine the sources of violations
of the martingale restriction.
The main results of the analysis are as follows. The implied DAX value is almost always
larger than the observed index price which is the same phenomenon as the one observed
by Longsta [9] for the U.S. market. A possible interpretation is that market participants
consider the implied price the true price they would have to pay for the DAX to be able
to duplicate a position in options, so that the dierence to the observed index level could
be due to transaction costs.
The direction of the DAX pricing dierences as well as their regularity is the same for
puts and calls with signicantly larger dierences for puts. Regression analyses show that
for calls the average time to maturity of the options used in the estimation as well as
4 Longsta [9] calls Q the risk-neutral measure instead of forward risk-adjusted measure. Under interest
rate certainty the two measures are identical. However, in the literature on valuation of interest rate
derivatives Q is usually termed the forward risk-adjusted measure (see, e.g., Jamshidian [7]), since under
Q the forward prices of all assets are martingales. Note that Q is horizon-specic, i.e. it dependes on T .
The risk-neutral measure ~Q has the property that under ~Q the futures prices of all assets are martingales.
The general pricing equation also shows the reason why Longsta [9] calls his empirical analysis a test of
the martingale restriction. If we consider the underlying asset S of an option as an option with a zero strike
price then the general pricing equation also has to hold for S, i.e. St = dt;T Ê
Q [ST ] or, alternatively, after















since dT;T = 1. The last equation shows that Std
 1
t;T is a martingale under Q.
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their average moneyness is an important determinant for the amount of the pricing error.
When index pricing errors from put estimations are analyzed we nd that the DAX pricing
error decreases with the number of options used in the estimation process as well as with
the average relative spread of the options whereas it increases with time to maturity and
average moneyness.
Comparing volatilities implied from option prices when the observed index price is used
in the estimation to the case when also the DAX level is inferred from market prices for
options we again nd systematic dierences. For calls we obtain larger volatilities when the
observed index price is used in the estimation whereas just the opposite result is obtained
for puts.
Theoretical call prices are smaller than market prices when the observed index price is
used in the course of volatility estimation. The dierences change sign when also the index
is implicitly estimated, whereas theoretical put prices are smaller than market prices in
both cases. Call pricing errors (theoretical minus observed prices) are negatively related
to time to maturity, relative spread, and moneyness, they increase with increasing option
prices. For puts the most important determinants of pricing errors are again the moneyness
of an option (with a negative impact) and its relative spread and time to maturity.
For implied distributions calculated according to Rubinstein's [12] method we nd some
interesting dierences between puts and calls. For calls the market assigns a larger prob-
abilitiy mass to states around the forward price of the index whereas in the market for
puts state prices are higher than in the lognormal case for states with either very high or
very low index prices. The average dierences between implied and a priori distributions
are not driven by outliers, their behavior across the dierent option series is remarkably
stable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section will describe the data that
were used in the course of the study as well as some methodological items. In Section 3
the empirical results of the analysis are presented, and Section 4 contains a summary and
some concluding remarks.
2 Data and Methodology
The basic sample for this study consists of all best bid and best ask quotes for DAX
options traded on the DTB for the rst six months of 1994. The quotes are time-stamped
to fractions of a second, and they were considered good until changed. This yields a time-
series of simultaneous best bid and best ask prices. The DTB is a fully computerized
exchange, and there are no trades inside the spread, so that all transactions occur at either
the bid or the ask. Therefore, we use the midpoint between bid and ask as an estimate of
the true value of the option. Besides the option data we also use DAX prices from KISS
(Kurs-Informations-Service-System) which are time-stamped to the nearest minute.
To be in the nal sample for this study an option had to have a remaining time to maturity
of at least ve days. After deleting all option observations with a shorter maturity we
selected the minute (or the minutes) with the highest aggregate quotation activity (in
terms of the number of bid and ask quotes) for puts and calls to make sure that the data
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we use did not suer from insucient liquidity or stale quotes. In case there were several
minutes on a given day with equal market activity we kept all of them in the sample to
retain as many observations as possible.5 Since the DAX option is a very liquid contract
there may be several bid and ask quotes for a given option, i.e. a put or a call with a
certain strike price and a certain maturity date. Only the rst of these observations was
kept in the sample. The option observations were then matched with the DAX prices for the
corresponding minute. The descriptive statistics for our nal sample are given in Table 1.
There is a total of 7,263 observations for calls in 485 series6 and 6,955 observations for
puts in 499 series, yielding an average of 14.97 options per series for calls and 13.94 for
puts. There were always at least six individual options available for all the estimations
with a maximum of 30 for calls and 29 for puts. Time to maturity ranged from seven days
to about nine months for both option types. As expected the average moneyness of the
options dened as the dierence of the observed index level and the strike price divided
by the strike price is close to zero for both puts (0.0176) and calls (0.0197). An interesting
result are the numbers for the relative spreads of the options dened as the dierence
between ask and bid divided by the midpoint. With 7.7% and 10.8%, respectively, mean
spreads as a measure of transaction costs in the options market are relatively high for
both calls and puts, and relative spreads are signcantly larger for puts. The test for the
null hypothesis of equal mean spreads yields a highly signicant t-value. A similar result
in terms of average spreads was also obtained by Ludecke [10] for options on individual
stocks traded on the DTB.
To estimate implied parameters from an option pricing model a discount factor for the
maturity of the given option series is needed. Since there are no actively traded default risk-
free discount bonds in Germany the discount factor was estimated implicitly as suggested
by Shimko [14] together with an implied index value from the pair of the two closest
at-the-money puts and calls using the standard put-call parity relationship. With (Ci; Pi)
(i = 1; 2) denoting the two pairs of option prices with common maturity  and strike
prices Xi (i = 1; 2) the implied discount factor d̂ and the implied index level dDAX are
the solution to the following system of two equations:
C1   P1 = dDAX  X1d̂
C2   P2 = dDAX  X2d̂ :
The solution is given by
d̂ =
(C1   P1)  (C2   P2)
X2  X1
dDAX = (C1   P1)X2   (C2   P2)X1
X2  X1
:
This implied discount factor d̂ is used for all further computations. The calculation of the
implied discount factor is the only case in this study when put and call prices are used
5 This means that there may be more than one estimation on a given day.
6 An option series is a collection of options of one type (calls or puts) with identical maturity dates
and dierent strike prices. We do not use all the options observed in a given minute as one sample for
the estimation of implied volatilities and implied index levels, since a deterministically varying volatility
for dierent maturity dates does not contradict the assumptions of the Black and Scholes [2] model.
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simultaneously. All the following estimations are performed separately for puts and calls
to be able to detect systematic dierences between the two option types.
Individual implied volatilities are estimated in the standard fashion, i.e. given all the other
inputs the volatility is changed until the theoretical price of the option, given by the Black
and Scholes formula, is equal to its market price.
To obtain a single implied volatility number for a given option series we used the procedure
suggested by Whaley [16], i.e. a non-linear regression was run of observed option prices
on the theoretical values given by the Black and Scholes formula [2]. More formally, given







with Pi and P̂I;i(̂I) as the observed and theoretical price for option i (i = 1; : : : ; N). We
will refer to this method as the Longsta I method.
To test the martingale restriction we use the Longsta II (rst suggested by Manaster
and Rendleman [11]) method to estimate both the implied volatility and the implied DAX
price, again via a non-linear regression minimizing the sum of squared distances between
observed and theoretical option prices. The volatility and price estimates are denoted
by ̂II and P̂II , and dDAX II represents an estimate of the implied index level. Formally,




Pi   P̂II;i(̂II ; dDAX II)i2 :
over all possible pairs of implied volatilities and index levels. The formal test of the mar-
tingale restriction will then be performed by comparing the observed and implied index
prices DAX and dDAX II as well as the two volatility estimates ̂I and ̂II .
To compute implied distributions the implied volatility of the option closest at the money
was used to construct a binomial tree with fty ending nodes, irrespective of the time to
maturity of the options.7 The tree was set up in the standard fashion according to Cox,











with r as the estimated risk-free rate p.a. of interest derived from the implied discount
factor d̂ for the corresponding maturity, t as the length of a time step, and ̂ as the
estimate of implied volatility.With n steps the a priori probability for state i (i = 1; : : : ; 50)







7 Alternatively, trees with 100 ending nodes were tried, but the main dierence between the two
approaches was the larger number of nodes with a zero implied probability when 100 nodes were used.
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i.e. the nodes are numbered such that node 1 represents the highest terminal index price,
followed by node 2, and so on. The associated terminal index values DAXi were later used
to compute option payos in the dierent states.
Implied state probabilities q̂i were then estimated by minimizing the sum of squared de-






The constraints under which (1) was minimized were the same as those used by Rubin-
stein [12]:
1. All implied state probabilities had to be non-negative, i.e. q̂i  0 (i = 1; : : : ; 50).
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2. All the resulting theoretical option prices, i.e. the discounted expected payos, had
to fall between the observed bid and ask prices of the options. Formally this means






i ) as the observed ask (bid) price and P̂i as the theoretical
price of the option. The theoretical price in turn is given by the standard binomial
option pricing formula (Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein [4]). The terminal payo in state
i is given as maxfDAXi  X; 0g for a call and maxfX  DAXi; 0g for a put.
3. The theoretical current index level when computed as the discounted expectation of
terminal index values9 had to fall within a band with a width of 1 percent of the
observed index level, i.e. we assumed an 0.5% half spread for the index.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Testing the martingale restriction: implied index prices, im-
plied volatilities, and theoretical option prices
Tables 2 and 3 show summary statistics for the estimation results for the call and put
samples. The variables of interest are observed and implied index values as well as implied
volatilities for dierent estimation methods and option pricing errors for the two Longsta
methods described in section 2.
The martingale restriction for option pricing does not hold if implied and observed under-
lying price are signicantly dierent and if these dierences are not due to market frictions
like transaction costs or short selling restrictions. Looking at the rst panel in Table 2 we
nd that the implied index value from the Longsta II method dDAX II is on average larger
than the observed index price denoted by DAX. The mean dierence is around twelve
index points which corresponds to just 0.57 percent given an average index level of more
8 Earlier computations using a simpler approach without the non-negativity constraint showed that
negative probabilities occurred rather frequently. In a frictionless market this would already indicate an
arbitrage opportunity, since the forward risk-adjusted measure does not exist in this case. A qualitatively
similar result with some negative state probabilities was obtained by Rubinstein [12].
9 This just means that the index is also priced according to the binomial model. It can be interpreted
as an option with a strike price of zero.
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than 2,100 points. Even the maximummispricing is only around 2.5 percent of the average
index value for negative mispricing and 3.5 percent for positive mispricing. However, the
dierence between implied and observed index level is statistically signcant, a t-test for
the null hypothesis of a zero mean dierence yields a test statistic of 24.7, which is far
beyond conventional critical values. Furthermore, for 479 out of a total of 485 option series
(98.76 percent) the implied index level is greater than the observed DAX price (see also
Figure 2). This shows that the average mispricing is not caused by outliers in the data. The
systematic pattern seems to support the hypothesis that market participants implicitly add
transaction costs to the observed index value since this number would represent the true
cost of setting up a duplicating portfolio for a DAX call option.10 Of course, in frictionless
markets the two index prices would have to be equal in the absence of arbitrage.
Table 3 shows similar tendencies for estimations done with put options. Here the implied
index price is also on average higher than the observed DAX price. With an average of
30 index points the dierences are larger than for call options, and the dierence in DAX
pricing quality between calls and puts is also statistically signicant. A t-test for equal
mean DAX pricing errors for puts and calls yielded a statistic with an absolute value of
24.6 which is highly signicant. Again the signs of the dierences are not random. 489
out of 499 observations (98 percent) exhibit a positive sign. This also becomes clear from
Figure 3. As for calls the data points are heavily concentrated below the 45 degree line,
i.e. in the area where the implied index level is greater than the observed price. For puts
we also observe that the horizontal distance of the data points gets larger for larger index
values, i.e. for larger observed DAX prices we also observe larger pricing errors.
Taken together these results suggests that similar to the ndings by Longsta [9] the
martingale restriction seems to be violated. Table 6 shows the results of multiple regressions
with (relative) DAX pricing errors as dependent variables. Explanatory variables are the
number of options in a given series that were used for the estimation procedure (N), the
average relative spread of the options in the series (SPREAD), the time to maturity (T )
of the options (identical for all options of a given series and measured in years), and the
average relative moneyness of the options (MONEY ) in the given series.
The results are dierent for calls and puts. Whereas for calls pricing errors and relative
pricing errors tend to become larger with an increasing number of observations, we ob-
serve the opposite tendency for puts. The coecient of N for pricing errors is, however,
insignicant for calls, so we can not conclude that there is indeed a relationship between
these two variables. Since the vast number of pricing errors is positive this means that the
quality of implied DAX pricing improves for puts with an increasing number of options
that are available for the estimation.
For the average spread we obtain coecients that are similar for calls and puts. Again, the
estimates in the regressions for calls are not statistically signicant, and the impact is also
numerically larger for puts. The general result is that for a series with a larger average
relative spread we obtain a smaller pricing error.
The variable MONEY has a postive sign for puts and a negative sign for calls, and it is
statistically signicant in all four regressions. For an interpretation of this result we have to
10 Since the DAX contains thirty stocks a natural assumption is that a recorded DAX price contains a
roughly equal number of most recent transactions at the bid and at the ask so that the price rather reects
a midpoint and not the bid or the ask.
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keep in mind that the variable MONEY is dened identically for puts and calls. Whereas
a call is far in the money for a large positive value of MONEY the opposite is true for a
put. Thus the implied DAX price is in general closer to the observed index level if we use
options that are 'far in the money' (calls with a large positive value for MONEY , puts
with a large negative value for this variable) to estimate the implied index price. Option
pricing theory provides a reasoning which may help to explain the better index pricing
quality of in the money options. Since DAX options are European the value of an option
that is far in the money approaches a boundary which is independent of the pricing model
and allows for a static replication of the option. This static duplication is possible with
much lower transaction costs than those accumulated in a dynamic strategy.11 Finally, the
average time to maturity also has a signicant impact on the amount of the pricing error.
For both types of options we nd that with an increasing time to maturity of the options
we also obtain larger DAX pricing errors.
Figure 1 shows a typical smile pattern for DAX options. We nd a negative slope of the
implied volatility curve with respect to the strike price of the options. This pattern is pretty
stable for calls across the option series in our sample, for puts there are also cases when
the curve is upward sloping. The general tendency is, however, that individual implied
volatilities within a given series are not constant across strike prices which they should
be for the Black and Scholes model to be valid. The second panel in Table 2 and Table 3
contains the average of the mean individual implied volatility per series denoted by .
This makes it possible to compare the single value estimated by the Longsta methods to
an estimate giving equal weight to each of the options in a given series.12
Comparing rst the two implied volatilities from the Longsta I and II methods we again
nd a systematic dierence between the two estimates. Figures 4 and 5 show plots of ̂I
versus ̂II for calls and puts. Whereas for puts ̂II is consistently greater than ̂I (489
out of 499 cases) the dierences have the opposite sign for calls (479 out of 485 cases).
This may seem surprising at a rst glance, but the result is perfectly consistent with the
ndings for the implied estimation of the index level. For both calls and puts we observe
that the implied index level is systematically larger than the observed DAX price. For the
squared dierence between theoretical and market prices to be as small as possible this
means that in the Longsta II procedure the implied volatility ̂II has to be lower for calls,
since this reduces the theoretical price which increases due to a higher implied index level.
For puts the argument works exactly in the opposite direction: the theoretical option value
decreases with an increasing implied index price so that there is a tendency for ̂II to
increase to compensate the decrease in the put price. The results for implied index levels
and implied volatilities are therefore not independent of each other, they are a more or
less direct consequence of the estimation procedure.
Table 7 shows the results of some regressions with the dierences between ̂II and ̂I as
the dependent variable. The set of regressors was the same as for the analysis of DAX
pricing errors above. For calls the average relative moneyness as well as time to maturity
are signicant sources of variation in (absolute) volatility dierences. With an increasing
average moneyness the dierence ̂II  ̂I tends to become numerically larger which means
11 In the case of a call option with maturity  this boundary is given by DAX   Xd , and for a put
the limiting value is Xd  DAX.
12 In a recent paper Dumas, Fleming and Whaley [5] estimate a linear function relating the implied
volatility of S&P 500 index options to the strike price and time to maturity of these options.
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that due to the systematic sign it will be closer to zero. The oppostie eect is observed
for time to maturity. The negative coecient in the call regression means that the two
volatility estimates will be further apart for longer term options.
For the implied volatilities from put estimations we obtain a more systematic result. The
coecients for all the four variables are signicant in both regressions. The dierence
̂II   ̂I increases with time to maturity and average relative moneyness and decreases
with an increasing number of options available for estimation and a larger average relative
spread. Note that the interpretation of the coecients here is opposite to the case of call
options, since the dierences ̂II   ̂I are positive in most cases.
The grand mean of individual implied volatilities denoted by  is the highest of all implied
volatility estimates for calls whereas for puts its value is located between the two Longsta
estimators. Overall the common implied volatilities are pretty similar to the average of
individual implied volatilities, so that the use of the arithmetic average of individual implied
volatilities seems justied as a rst approximation to a joint volatility estimate for all
options of a given series.
Finally, one can look at the theoretical option prices generated by the estimation proced-
ures. A number of descriptive statistics on the dierences between these theoretical prices
and the observed market prices (midpoints) are given in the third panel of Table 2 and
Table 3. It is interesting to note that put options are underpriced by both the Longsta
I and II method (negative average dierence between theoretical price and market price)
whereas calls are underpriced by Longsta I and overpriced by Longsta II. The pricing
errors for calls are statistically dierent from zero for both methods, standard t-tests for a
zero mean error yield statistics of  10:127 for Longsta I and 4.300 for Longsta II. For
puts we obtain t-statistics of  9:662 and  9:245, respectively. As expected the average
pricing error is larger for the Longsta I method than for Longsta II, since with the im-
plied index price there is additional free parameter so that a better t should be obtained.
The pricing quality of the Black and Scholes model is furthermore signicantly better for
calls than for puts. Except for the raw pricing error of the Longsta I estimation raw and
relative pricing errors are always signcantly larger for puts than for calls.13
The amount of the pricing dierence can be considerable: the largest negative relative
mispricing was around  83 percent of the observed price for calls and right around  100
percent for puts. These numbers may be at least partly caused by some market frictions
like the tick size for option prices which do not exist in the theoretical model.14 On the other
hand these extreme value statistics are furthermore heavily inuenced by a few outliers,
since the 5 percent and 95 percent quantiles of call pricing errors are  6:357 and 5.597
for Longsta I and  2:666 and 2.967 for Longsta II, respectively. For relative call pricing
errors these quantiles are also far away from the minimum and the maximum given in
Table 2.15
Similar results are found for puts where only ve percent of the Longsta I pricing errors
13 The t-statistics of the tests are signcant at levels much smaller than 1 percent.
14 The eect of price discreteness may be expected to be especially severe for options far out of the
money with a very low price. To take this into account the observed option price is included in the
regression equations for option pricing dierences.
15 The exact values for the 5 percent and 95 percent quantiles are  3:64 percent and 21.75 percent for
Longsta I, and  2:30 percent and 9.55 percent for Longsta II, respectively.
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are smaller than  7:110 and only ve percent greater than 6.631. Again the ndings are
similar for relative errors and for the Longsta II method.16
Tables 4 and 5 show the results of an analysis concerned with the location of theoretical
option prices generated by the Longsta methods relative to bid and ask. Even a large
dierence between theoretical and observable prices does not necessarily imply that the
model misprices options. Especially in the case when quote data are explicitly available we
can check if the theoretical prices are still within the band created by the currently best bid
ans ask prices. The observations have been classied according to moneyness and time to
maturity. The options with the lowest moneyness are in the group identied byM = 1, and
MAT equals one for the options with the shortest maturity. N denotes the total number
of options in a given cell, and the following four lines indicate how many theoretical prices
are larger than the ask (P̂j > Pa; j = I; II) or less than the bid (P̂j < Pb; j = I; II).
Looking at calls rst we nd that in total the number of mispricings outside the spread are
lower for Longsta II than for Longsta I (1058 vs. 2949), which is expected due to the
additional degree of freedom in the tting procedure. Note, however, that for a test of the
Black and Scholes model it is the Longsta I method which is relevant, since pricing has to
be done relative to the current observable index level. For options with low moneyness we
mainly nd that theoretical prices tend to be too large, since the number of observations
above the ask clearly execeeds the number of observations with theoretical prices lower
than the bid. For example, for M = 1 and Longsta I there are 545 cases with overpricing
as opposed to only 6 observations for underpricing. An even stronger tendency is found
for M = 2 with (again for Longsta I) 1,077 overpriced and only 17 underpriced options.
ForM = 3 overpricing and underpricing occurs with roughly similar frequencies, although
overpricing is still found more often.
The picture is completely dierent for options with high moneyness. Here we nd no
overpricing at all by Longsta I, but many cases of underpricing. So we can conclude
that moneyness is a very important variable for predicting substantial deviations between
theoretical Black and Scholes prices and market prices. The mispricing behavior also shows
some variation with respect to time to maturity in that mispricing occurs more frequently
for options with longer maturity, but the eect is not as pronounced as for moneyness.
Looking at the results of this analysis for puts we nd exactly the same tendencies as for
calls. This is somehow surprising, since a low value for M means that the current index
level is much lower than the strike price which means that puts are 'deep in the money'.
Nevertheless, there is not a single case of a theoretical price being less than the bid for
Longsta I in groups M = 1 andM = 2. Again, forM = 3 the probability of underpricing
is about the same as that for overpricing, but for M = 4 and M = 5 options are almost
always underpriced by the model. Again, also time to maturity is an explanatory factor
with more frequent mispricing for options with longer maturity, although again with less
predictive power than moneyness.
Figures 6 to 9 show plots of relative pricing errors against relative moneyness. For both
calls and puts we observe that pricing errors decline the further the option is in the money,
16 The exact values for the 5 percent and 95 percent quantiles of relative pricing errors are  55:71 percent
and 5.02 percent for Longsta I, and  34:07 percent and 2.91 percent for Longsta II, respectively. This
provides some more evidence for the hypothesis that the pricing quality of the Black and Scholes model
is worse for puts than for calls.
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i.e. for a negative value of MONEY for puts and a positive one for calls. The reason
for this may be that the further an option is in the money the closer its value gets to a
model-independent boundary, so that the pricing error is likely to decrease even if there are
discrepancies between the assumed model and the true pricing mechanism used by market
participants. It is interesting to note that options which are slightly out of the money tend
to be overpriced by the model in the case of calls whereas we observe just the opposite for
puts. Furthermore, calls that are not too far in the money seem to be underpriced, so that
there seems to be a quadratic relationship between relative moneyness and relative pricing
error. For this reason the regression model for pricing errors includes both the variables
MONEY and MONSQR, the squared value of MONEY .
The regression results are presented in Table 8. Except for four cases all the coecients
are signicant at the 5 percent level. The explained portion of the pricing error variance
is in general larger for the Longsta I method as can be seen from the adjusted R2 values
for the individual regressions.
Pricing errors usually decrease with the variable MONEY , except for (absolute) pricing
errors for calls although the coecients are not signicant at the 5% level. For squared
moneyness MONSQR the coecient usually has a positive sign and is highly signcant
with the only exception relative put pricing dierences generated by Longsta II. This
supports the hypothesis presented above that it is rather the distance from zero than the
actual location of moneyness that has an impact on pricing errors. A positive impact of
MONSQR on pricing errors is, however, oset by a negative coecient for MONEY
for small values of this variable, since in this case jMONEY j > jMONSQRj so that the
impact of moneyness in linear form is dominant. Pricing errors exhhibit the tendency to
increase with time to maturity for puts in general, whereas we obtain a negative coecient
for T for relative call pricing error regressions. We obtain negative coecients (except for
one put regression) for the relative spread of an option which means that options with a
lower spread are better priced by the model. This result has an intuitive explanation: our
'observed' price is taken to be the midpoint between the bid and the ask which is merely
an assumption. If the true price is not exactly half way between bid and ask chances are
that the perceived mispricing will be larger the wider the band between the best quotes
even if the model hits the (unknown) true price exactly.
Finally, the observed option price P has a negative coecient in six of the eight regressions,
the two exceptions being the relative pricing errors for calls. This means that for more
expensive options model prices tend to be closer to market prices which is consistent with
the impact of moneyness on pricing quality.
3.2 Implied distributions for DAX options
The algorithm to estimate implied state probabilities always converged rapidly without
any numerical problems. The results are presented graphically in Figures 10 to 13. The
graphs in Figures 10 and 12 show the average dierence for each of the 50 nodes between
the implied probability and the a priori specied lognormal (or binomial) distribution. Of
course, the sum of these dierences across all nodes has to be equal to zero. Figures 11
and 13 show the share of positive dierences q̂i   qi for the 50 nodes. As described above
the numbering of the terminal states along the horizontal axis is from the lowest terminal
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DAX price (node 1) to the highest (node 50).
Taking a look at implied distributions for calls rst we nd that the market obviously puts
more probability mass on events where the terminal index price is close to the forward price
(which is the mean of the distribution under the forward risk-adjusted measure). Arrow-
Debreu securities which have a payo in one of these states of the world are therefore
more expensive than predicted by the standard binomial (or the Black and Scholes) option
pricing model. Note that this does not necessarily mean that certain types of calls are
overpriced. Since the call price is the sum of the state dependent payos multiplied by the
price of the associated Arrow-Debreu security, the positive pricing error induced by state
prices which are too high may be (more than) oset by other state prices which are too low
compared to standard option pricing models. Looking at the graph in Figure 10 we nd that
the implied state prices for relatively high terminal index values are lower than indicated
by the binomial model. For example, a call with a strike price that generates positive
payos in states 26 through 50 may well have a market price that is very similar to its
theoretical Black and Scholes price, since there are some overpriced and some underpriced
states in this range. However, we can deduce that if we are able to construct a portfolio
of DAX call options yielding positive payos in states 26 to 31 then this portfolio will
have a higher market price than predicted by the binomial model. Accordingly, portfolios
of call options with payos only in states 32 through 50 or 1 through 25 are likely to be
cheaper than predicted by the binomial model.17 Around the forward price of the index
the probability dierences show a very systematic behavior which becomes obvious from
the graph in Figure 11. In the center of the distribution the implied probability is greater
than the a priori probability for more than 90 percent of the 485 series whereas for other
areas this share is well below 50 percent, i.e. the majority of dierences is negative. It is
nally interesting to note that the average probability dierence in states of high terminal
index values is close to zero, although the share of positive dierences is only around ten
percent. This may seem strange, but the reason is that only the share of strictly positive
dierences is plotted. For calls more than 90 percent of the dierences for nodes 48 through
50 are equal to zero and thus not strictly positive. The same phenomenon is observable for
nodes 1 through 3, where the share of zero dierences is around 82 percent. At the lower
and upper tails of the distribution the binomial probabilities are so small that they are not
dierent from zero with eight signicant digits. If the optimization procedure also assigns
a zero probability for these states we will obtain an observation with a zero dierence.
Except for the tails of the distribution there are no other cases when the two distributions
assign numerically identical probabilities to a given state. In general we may conclude from
the results obtained for calls that investors in the market for DAX calls seem to consider
medium range changes in the index less likely than predicted by the binomial option pricing
model. On the other hand there is stronger belief in the market that the terminal index
value will be somewhere around the forward price. There is only slight evidence for a
phenomenon which Rubinstein [12] calls 'crash-o-phobia', i.e. a larger implied probability
for states with a very low index value, since for nodes 1 to 11 the dierences between
implied and a priori probabilities are positive but very small in absolute value.
17 Shimko [15] uses this fact to design trading strategies based on an investor's subjective probability
assessment. The investor should sell Arrow-Debreu securities for states for which his subjective probability
is lower than the market estimate and vice versa. In the situation described above the investor should sell
short a buttery spread if he believes that the binomial model is the correct description for stock price
movements.
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The result for puts is dierent. Looking at the dierences q̂i  qi for small i, i.e. for states
with a low DAX price we nd that investors are willing to pay more for state contingent
payos in this range of index prices. This may be evidence for an extra premium for the
insurance function of a put with a rather low strike price so that it has a positive payo
only in these states. Whereas we do not nd such a pronounced tendency in the market
for calls this nding represents a 'crash-o-phobia'. Figure 13 also supports this hypothesis,
since for the vast number of option series we obtain indeed implied probabilities which are
larger than their binomial counterparts. Another dierence between implied distributions
for calls and puts is obvious for nodes 32 through 50, i.e. for states with high index values.
Whereas in the market for calls there is a tendency for these Arrow-Debreu securities
to be cheaper than in the binomial model the opposite is observable for puts. All the
states have a higher implied than a priori probability, i.e. a portfolio of puts with positive
payos in the states and zero payo in others is more expensive in the market than we
would expect from the binomial model. If an investor has the binomial as his subjective
probability distribution he would be willing to sell this portfolio short, since he considers
it overpriced by the market. Note, however, that this is not an arbitrage transaction, it is
based solely on speculative arguments (dierences in expectations). As for calls we also
observe negative average dierences for nodes 14 to 25 which represent states in which
the index has declined but they certainly do not represent a crash. The absolute values
of the dierences are much larger than for calls, and the shares of positive dierences are
close to zero in this range of states. Portfolios of put options with postive payo in only
these states are thus cheaper than predicted by our a priori distribution.
4 Summary and Conclusions
The two major purposes of this study were to conduct an empirical investigation into the
pricing of DAX options on the DTB, the German nancial futures and options exchange
and to take a look at index price distributions implied by option prices. DAX options
are of the European type and the underlying index DAX is a performance index, i.e. it is
basically a non-dividend paying asset. These features would allow to use simple valuation
models based on a lognormal or binomial distribution of terminal values of the underlying
asset. The basic idea behind a test of the martingale restriction is to infer the implied
current underlying price from option prices and to compare it to the contemporaneously
observable market price. If there are signicant dierences then the conclusion is that
there are either market frictions preventing strict no-arbitrage relationships from holding
or that investors are using a valuation model that is dierent from the one assumed by
the researcher. The results of a recent study by Longsta [9] indicate that for S&P 100
options the implied index level is systematically higher than the observed price, meaning
that the martingale restriction in its pure form is violated. Performing a similar test for
DAX options on the DTB we nd that also in the German market the implied cost of the
index is systematically higher than the observed market price. In contrast to Longsta
we are also able to use put options to infer implied parameters, and the results for the
implied DAX price are fully consistent with those for calls. Regression analyses show that
the number of options used in the estimation process as well as the time to maturity and
the average relative moneyness are signicant determinants for the amount of the pricing
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error. Volatility dierences between the two Longsta approaches are perfectly consistent
with the behavior of index pricing errors.
The second variable of interest is the pricing error of the options in the sample when
the implied paramters are estimated. Using the observed DAX price to estimate implied
volatilities yields theoretical call prices which are lower than market prices. Whereas the
sign of the average dierence changes when also the index price is estimated implicitly
puts are consistently underpriced. Important determinants for the amount of the pricing
error are the relative moneyness and its squared value, the relative bid-ask spread and the
observed option price.
Given a sucient number of option prices one can infer the distribution of the terminal
underlying price that is implied by the market prices of these contracts. For our sample of
DAX options we obtain dierent results for puts and calls. The prices of DAX calls imply
that on average the market assigns a higher probability than predicted by the lognormal
model to events close to the mean of the distribution of terminal index prices. On the
other hand states a little further away from the mean are considered less likely by market
participants. The ndings for puts suggest that in this market there is something similar
to a 'crash-o-phobia' eect, since the implied probability mass for states with a very low
terminal index level is much higher than under the lognormal distribution.
It is interesting to compare the approaches by Longsta [9] and by Rubinstein [12] with
respect to their estimation approaches. Whereas Longsta prespecies the type of distri-
bution for the terminal underlying price to infer only certain moments of it from market
prices Rubinstein does not put any restricitions on the shape of the distribution. The cost
for this extra degree of freedom is that Rubinstein uses the observed index price as one
additional call option with a zero strike price in the estimation process whereas Long-
sta focuses exactly on the relationship between observed and implied distribution. Given
the empirical results of this paper we nd that there are certainly pricing errors associ-
ated with the use of the Black and Scholes model (and thus the lognormal distribution).
The shape of the implied distribution is signcantly dierent. Besides the implementation
of alternative objective functions for the optimization procedure (as suggested already
by Rubinstein [12]) one could design tests of trading strategies based on the dierences
between implied and assumed distributions. Furthermore using the algorithm described
by Rubinstein [12] implied binomial trees can be constructed from the implied binomial
distributions. These implied trees may then be used to price American options, e.g. the
stock options traded on the DTB. All these tasks will be left for further research.
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Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Na 14.97 5.39 6.00 30.00
Tb 93.26 66.12 7.00 260.00
MONEYc 0.0197 0.0819 -0.1649 0.3904
SPREADd 0.0772 0.0898 0.0036 1.7113
Puts (499 series)
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Na 13.94 4.75 6.00 29.00
Tb 97.03 69.32 7.00 262.00
MONEYc 0.0176 0.0690 -0.1716 0.3736
SPREADd 0.1083 0.1616 0.0367 1.9683
a Number of observations per series. The total number of call (put) price observations is 7263 (6955).
b Time to maturity in days.
c Relative moneyness calculated for each individual option as
(DAX X)
X
with X as the exercise price
and DAX as the observed DAX price.
d Mean relative spread calculated for each individual option as 2 (BAP-BBP)/(BAP+BBP) with BAP
(BBP ) as the best ask (bid) price .
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Table 2:
Estimation Results for Calls
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Index values (485 observations)
DAXa 2152.56 67.5592 1967.36 2274.00dDAXII b 2165.33 65.8756 1988.69 2299.86dDAXII  DAX 12.7695 11.3916 -52.5922 71.6258
( dDAXII  DAX)=DAX 0.0060 0.0054 -0.0245 0.0336
Implied volatilities (485 observations)
̂I
c 0.1983 0.0182 0.1532 0.2478
̂II
d 0.1807 0.0223 0.1281 0.2393
e 0.2065 0.0259 0.1649 0.3773
̂I    -0.0082 0.0190 -0.1618 0.0057
(̂I   )= -0.0340 0.0690 -0.4821 0.0271
̂II    -0.0258 0.0195 -0.1736 0.0472
(̂II   )= -0.1219 0.0740 -0.5146 0.2601
̂II   ̂I -0.0176 0.0109 -0.0620 0.0451
(̂II   ̂I)=̂I -0.0900 0.0571 -0.3126 0.2454
Option prices (7263 observations)
P̂I   P
f -0.4702 3.9566 -77.6279 37.2392
(P̂I   P )=P 0.0317 0.1061 -0.8326 1.2786
P̂II   P
g 0.1112 2.2038 -61.2940 34.5313
(P̂II   P )=P 0.0092 0.0613 -0.9472 0.6716
a Observed DAX price.
b Implied DAX price from Longsta II method using the Black and Scholes formula.
c Implied volatility from Longsta I method using the Black and Scholes formula.
d Implied volatility from Longsta II method using the Black and Scholes formula.
e Mean of average individual implied volatilities per series.
f Dierence between implied price from Longsta I method and observed option price (midpoint
between bid and ask).
g Dierence between implied price from Longsta II method and observed option price (midpoint
between bid and ask).
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Table 3:
Estimation Results for Puts
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Index values (499 observations)
DAXa 2140.63 45.5523 2030.06 2259.36dDAXII b 2170.60 57.4345 2034.84 2418.04dDAXII  DAX 29.9752 27.6484 -29.7046 217.1555
( dDAXII  DAX)=DAX 0.0140 0.0128 -0.0140 0.1008
Implied volatilities (499 observations)
̂I
c 0.1988 0.0182 0.1558 0.2486
̂II
d 0.2340 0.0223 0.1580 0.3038
e 0.2035 0.0192 0.1623 0.2598
̂I    -0.0047 0.0080 -0.0688 0.0163
(̂I   )= -0.0220 0.0374 -0.2921 0.0912
̂II    0.0305 0.0211 -0.0775 0.1145
(̂II   )= 0.1551 0.1086 -0.3289 0.6046
̂II   ̂I 0.0352 0.0188 -0.0400 0.1173
(̂II   ̂I)=̂I 0.1810 0.1017 -0.1786 0.6291
Option prices (6955 observations)
P̂I   P
f -0.5162 4.4560 -67.2018 42.5642
(P̂I   P )=P -0.1008 0.2060 -0.9999 1.2462
P̂II   P
g -0.2294 2.0699 -49.6477 50.0770
(P̂II   P )=P -0.0486 0.1549 -0.9999 0.8183
a Observed DAX price.
b Implied DAX price from Longsta II method using the Black and Scholes formula.
c Implied volatility from Longsta I method using the Black and Scholes formula.
d Implied volatility from Longsta II method using the Black and Scholes formula.
e Mean of average individual implied volatilities per series.
f Dierence between implied price from Longsta I method and observed option price (midpoint
between bid and ask).
g Dierence between implied price from Longsta II method and observed option price (midpoint
between bid and ask).
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Table 4:
Location of Theoretical Call Prices
Relative to Observed Bid and Ask Prices
by Moneynessa and Maturityb
MAT = 1 MAT = 2 MAT = 3 MAT = 4 Total
N c 39 97 86 457 679
P̂I > Pa
d 12 83 84 366 545
M = 1 P̂I < Pb
e 6 0 0 0 6
P̂II > Pa
f 0 30 41 147 218
P̂II < Pb
g 15 7 1 10 33
N 211 398 272 809 1690
P̂I > Pa 163 317 208 389 1077
M = 2 P̂I < Pb 5 0 0 12 17
P̂II > Pa 91 151 88 134 464
P̂II < Pb 17 9 1 18 45
N 327 504 392 712 1935
P̂I > Pa 91 109 61 66 327
M = 3 P̂I < Pb 19 42 30 108 199
P̂II > Pa 40 48 9 12 109
P̂II < Pb 23 29 10 24 86
N 281 374 245 454 1354
P̂I > Pa 0 0 0 0 0
M = 4 P̂I < Pb 42 58 64 211 375
P̂II > Pa 5 3 0 3 11
P̂II < Pb 8 16 8 32 64
N 316 533 293 463 1605
P̂I > Pa 0 0 0 0 0
M = 5 P̂I < Pb 33 80 52 238 403
P̂II > Pa 2 8 5 8 23
P̂II < Pb 1 2 1 1 5
N 1174 1906 1288 2895 7263
P̂I > Pa 266 509 353 821 1949
Total P̂I < Pb 105 180 146 569 1000
P̂II > Pa 138 240 143 304 825
P̂II < Pb 64 63 21 85 233
a Moneyness classication: M = 1:  0:075 MONEY , M = 2: 0:075 < MONEY   0:025,
M = 3:  0:025 < MONEY  0:025, M = 4: 0:025 < MONEY  0:075,M = 4: 0:075 < MONEY .
b Maturity classication: MAT = 1: time to maturity at most 30 days, MAT = 2: time to maturity
between 31 and 60 days,MAT = 3: time to maturity between 61 and 90 days,MAT = 4: time to maturity
more than 90 days.
c Number of observations.
d Theoretical price from Longsta I method greater than observed ask price; absolute frequency.
e Theoretical price from Longsta I method less than observed bid price; absolute frequency.
f Theoretical price from Longsta II method greater than observed ask price; absolute frequency.
g Theoretical price from Longsta II method less than observed bid price; absolute frequency.
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Table 5:
Location of Theoretical Put Prices
Relative to Observed Bid and Ask Prices
by Moneynessa and Maturityb
MAT = 1 MAT = 2 MAT = 3 MAT = 4 Total
N c 79 92 87 144 402
P̂I > Pa
d 1 14 64 115 194
M = 1 P̂I < Pb
e 0 0 0 0 0
P̂II > Pa
f 0 0 0 2 2
P̂II < Pb
g 0 0 2 3 5
N 267 403 270 683 1623
P̂I > Pa 37 145 117 371 670
M = 2 P̂I < Pb 0 0 0 0 0
P̂II > Pa 10 6 13 12 41
P̂II < Pb 1 6 1 14 22
N 337 511 387 861 2096
P̂I > Pa 43 85 67 147 342
M = 3 P̂I < Pb 72 103 69 134 378
P̂II > Pa 48 53 50 98 249
P̂II < Pb 24 8 12 16 60
N 238 394 263 647 1542
P̂I > Pa 1 0 0 2 3
M = 4 P̂I < Pb 222 379 226 548 1375
P̂II > Pa 3 16 10 43 72
P̂II < Pb 167 131 43 47 388
N 96 357 240 599 1292
P̂I > Pa 0 0 0 0 0
M = 5 P̂I < Pb 95 356 240 595 1286
P̂II > Pa 0 0 1 10 11
P̂II < Pb 89 315 194 337 1292
N 1017 1757 1247 2934 6955
P̂I > Pa 82 244 248 635 1209
Total P̂I < Pb 389 838 535 1277 3039
P̂II > Pa 61 75 74 165 375
P̂II < Pb 281 460 252 417 1410
a Moneyness classication: M = 1:  0:075 MONEY , M = 2: 0:075 < MONEY   0:025,
M = 3:  0:025 < MONEY  0:025, M = 4: 0:025 < MONEY  0:075,M = 4: 0:075 < MONEY .
b Maturity classication: MAT = 1: time to maturity at most 30 days, MAT = 2: time to maturity
between 31 and 60 days,MAT = 3: time to maturity between 61 and 90 days,MAT = 4: time to maturity
more than 90 days.
c Number of observations.
d Theoretical price from Longsta I method greater than observed ask price; absolute frequency.
e Theoretical price from Longsta I method less than observed bid price; absolute frequency.
f Theoretical price from Longsta II method greater than observed ask price; absolute frequency.
g Theoretical price from Longsta II method less than observed bid price; absolute frequency.
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Table 6:
Regression Analysis for DAX Pricing Errorsa
Dep. Variable Constant N b ARSc T d MONEY e Adj. R2
Calls (485 observations)dDAXII  DAX 8.8658 0.2082f -8.1552f 30.1289 -62.1085 0.4886
( dDAXII  DAX)=DAX 0.0040 0:0001 -0.0032f 0.0136 -0.0327 0.4849
Puts (499 observations)dDAXII  DAX 26.3637 -3.4741 -23.1028 120.3212 330.0830 0.6103
( dDAXII  DAX)=DAX 0.0122 -0.0016 -0.0104 0.0553 0.1466 0.6189
a Coecients are signcant at the 5% level unless otherwise indicated.
b Number of options used for estimation.
c Average relative spread.
d Time to maturity in years.
e Average relative moneyness.
f Coecient not signicant at the 5% level.
Table 7:
Regression Analysis for Implied Volatility Dierencesa
Dep. Variable Constant N b ARSc T d MONEY e Adj. R2
Calls (485 observations)
̂II   ̂I -0.0214 < 0:0001
f 0.0001f -0.0069 0.0529 0.2003
(̂II   ̂I)=̂I -0.1115 0.0009
f 0.0233f -0.0604 0.2164 0.2182
Puts (499 observations)
̂II   ̂I 0.0416 -0.0026 -0.0218 0.0358 0.2523 0.3859
(̂II   ̂I)=̂I 0.2085 -0.0137 -0.1000 0.2138 1.2691 0.3769
a Coecients signifcant at the 5% level unless otherwise indicated.
b Number of options used for estimation.
c Average relative spread.
d Time to maturity.
e Average realtive moneyness.
f Coecient not signicant at the 5% level.
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Table 8:
Regression Analysis of Option Pricing Errorsa
Dep. Variable Constant T b RSc MONEY d MONSQRe P f Adj. R2
Calls (7263 observations)
P̂I   P 3.5252 0.0095 -6.8560 2.2561
g 219.6087 -0.0454 0.5096
(P̂I   P )=P 0.0127 -0.0008 -0.0405 -2.2382 2.8711 0.0009 0.3897
P̂II   P 0.7274 0.0024 -2.2152 2.1353
g 72.1417 -0.0093 0.0764
(P̂II   P )=P 0.0327 -0.0002 -0.1767 -0.4401 1.1988 < 0:0001
g 0.1100
Puts (6955 observations)
P̂I   P 3.5234 0.0192 3.8091 -138.8813 404.3095 -0.0783 0.6108
(P̂I   P )=P 0.0893 0.0010 -0.3409 -4.1603 3.8914 -0.0025 0.8412
P̂II   P 2.9836 0.0141 -0.1650
g -58.4012 142.9362 -0.0564 0.1774
(P̂II   P )=P 0.0585 0.0005 -0.4872 -1.2929 -1.3629 -0.0009 0.7307
a Coecients are signicant at the 5% level using standard t-statistics unless otherwise indicated.
b Time to maturity.
c Relative spread.
d Relative moneyness.
e Relative moneyness squared.
f Observed price.
g Coecient not signcant at the 5% level.
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1 8 0 0 1 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 3 0 0 2 4 0 0
Figure 1:
Typical smile pattern for DAX options
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1 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 3 0 0
Figure 2:
Observed vs. implied DAX prices for calls
25
1 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 3 0 0 2 4 0 0 2 5 0 0
Figure 3:
Observed vs. implied DAX prices for puts
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0 . 1 2 0 . 1 4 0 . 1 6 0 . 1 8 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 2 0 . 2 4
Figure 4:
Implied volatilities from Longsta methods for calls
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0 . 1 5 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 5 0 . 3 0 0 . 3 5
Figure 5:
Implied volatilities from Longsta methods for puts
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- 0 . 2 - 0 . 1 0 . 0 0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 3 0 . 4
Figure 6:
Relative call pricing errors Longsta I versus moneyness
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- 0 . 2 - 0 . 1 0 . 0 0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 3 0 . 4
Figure 7:
Relative call pricing errors Longsta II versus moneyness
30
- 0 . 2 - 0 . 1 0 . 0 0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 3 0 . 4
Figure 8:
Relative put pricing errors Longsta I versus moneyness
31
- 0 . 2 - 0 . 1 0 . 0 0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 3 0 . 4
Figure 9:
Relative put pricing errors Longsta II versus moneyness
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Dierences between implied and a priori probabilities for calls
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Share of positive dierences
between implied and a priori distribution for calls
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Dierences between implied and a priori probabilities for puts
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Share of positive dierences
between implied and a priori distribution for puts
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